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Abstract
Bilateral aid allocation is affected by a number of factors on the donor side. It has been found that public
satisfaction with government positively affects the willingness to give bilateral aid (Gradstein and Chong,
2007). Economic and strategic interests of the donor country play a role in determining bilateral aid allocation
(Tingley, 2009). Perhaps the most interesting finding is that ideology has a significant impact on bilateral aid
allocation (Fleck and Kilby, 2001) (Milner and Tingley, 2010).
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BILATERAL AID TO LEAST DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES: A STUDY OF THE U.S., 
THE U.K., FRANCE, AND JAPAN
Dave Warren
I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
 Bilateral aid allocation is affected by a 
number of factors on the donor side. It has been 
found that public satisfaction with government 
positively affects the willingness to give bilateral 
aid (Gradstein and Chong, 2007). Economic and 
strategic interests of the donor country play a role 
in determining bilateral aid allocation (Tingley, 
2009). Perhaps the most interesting finding is that 
ideology has a significant impact on bilateral aid 
allocation (Fleck and Kilby, 2001) (Milner and Tin-
gley, 2010). 
 The relationship between ideology and 
aid allocation is not one-dimensional, meaning in 
some situations conservatives actually give more 
bilateral aid than liberals. However, liberal-con-
servative shifts in ideology tend to cause bilateral 
aid allocation to shift in a way that reflects the 
priorities of the ideology in control. Specifically, 
when the more liberal leaning party is in control, 
bilateral aid with humanitarian concerns and bi-
lateral aid to low-income countries increases (Tin-
gley, 2010). On the other hand, when the  more 
conservative leaning party is in control, bilateral 
aid allocation tends to shift away from humanitar-
ian concerns toward economic and trade driven 
concerns (Fleck and Kilby, 2001) (Ram, 2003). This 
makes sense due to the differences between lib-
eral and conservative ideology. Conservatives 
place an emphasis on limiting the role of govern-
ment. Thus limiting the ability of government to be 
used as a tool to eradicate inequality (Hicks and 
Swank, 1992). Furthermore, the conservative ide-
ology places an emphasis on shrinking the state 
budget which could lead to shrinking foreign aid 
budgets (Adams, 1998). This contrasts with liberals 
who place a greater emphasis on humanitarian 
concerns and believe in using the state as a tool 
to eradicate poverty (Hicks and Swank, 1992). 
Adding to this argument, it has been found that 
those who consider themselves left-leaning are 
more likely to approve of government humanitar-
ian aid than those who consider themselves right-
leaning  (Chong and Gradstein, 2008). 
 Multiple studies have viewed the role ide-
ology plays on bilateral aid allocation specifically 
for the United States. Fleck and Kilby (2006) re-
view party control in U.S. Congress and presiden-
tial control in relation to foreign bilateral aid. The 
study breaks up foreign bilateral aid into four cat-
egories: development concerns, strategic impor-
tance, commercial importance, and democrati-
zation. The major finding in the study is that when 
the president and Congress are more liberal, de-
velopment concerns receive more weight than 
when the president or Congress are more con-
servative. On the other hand, the study finds that 
when Congress is more conservative, commercial 
concerns have more weight than when Congress 
is liberal. Three separate regressions are used in 
the study. The dependent variable in regression 1 
is whether or not a country receives aid. The de-
pendent variable in regression 2 is whether or not 
the region (group of countries) receives aid. The 
dependent variable in regression 3 is the amount 
of aid a country receives. The independent vari-
ables in the study are the same for all three regres-
sions. They include: amount of aid given by small 
donor countries, U.S. exports, U.S. imports, UN vot-
ing, Democracy (of U.S.), GDP, and Population (of 
U.S.). The regressions run over several time periods 
to separate the effects of the cold war. The study 
uses panel data from 1960 through 1997.
 Fleck and Kilby published a follow up study 
in 2010 focusing on the same issues with the addi-
tion of the War on Terror. Their 2010 study reviewed 
the U.S. bilateral aid budget from 1955-2005 with 
respect to party control in Congress and the presi-
dency. The main finding of the study is that aid 
flows to all developing countries have increased 
recently, including those countries closely in-
volved in the War on Terror and those countries 
not involved with the War on Terror.
 Moss and Goldstein (2005) viewed the U.S. 
bilateral aid allocation situation using some differ-
ent methods than Fleck and Kilby. Their research 
question was: Are there differences through time 
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between the Republicans and the Democrats in 
terms of providing aid to Africa? The study used 
data from OECD on U.S. bilateral flows of over-
seas development assistance to Sub-Saharan Af-
rica from 1961-2000. There are several dependent 
variables in the study including: bilateral aid given 
to Sub-Saharan Africa in U.S. dollars adjusted for 
inflation; and the percentage of  all bilateral aid 
given to Sub-Saharan African countries.  The in-
dependent variables in the study are measures 
of political party control by year operationalized 
by dummy variables. Moss and Goldstein (2005) 
found that it is the relationship between Congress 
and the president that provides the most influ-
ence on how much aid is given. Specifically, they 
found that when one party has control of at least 
the presidency and house, aid flows to African 
developing countries are much higher than when 
the president and all of Congress are at odds.
 The purpose of this study is to view ideol-
ogy’s effect on bilateral aid allocation to LDCs, 
by focusing on the bilateral aid giving countries. 
This study will attempt to isolate precisely which 
pieces of government (if any) actually affect bi-
lateral aid given to LDCs.
II. HYPOTHESIS AND TESTING
 This study’s hypothesis is that, all factors 
held constant, the more liberal a government is 
the more that government will give bilateral aid 
to LDCs. To test the relationship between ideology 
and bilateral aid to LDCs, the top four bilateral aid 
donors are analyzed. These donors are the United 
States, The United Kingdom, France, and Japan. 
For each country two regressions are run: one 
spanning from 1960-2009 and the other spanning 
from 1980-2009. The purpose of the 1980-2009 re-
gression is to control for the possibility that the im-
portance of aiding LDCs changed over time. The 
results of the second regression should be more 
consistent with the current ideological views and 
current events. In all eight regressions the depen-
dent variable is bilateral aid to LDCs in current 
U.S. dollars. All eight regressions also include two 
independent variables GDP in current U.S. dollars 
and GDP growth with one year of lag applied. 
These data are from the World Bank. The inclu-
sion of both GDP and bilateral aid in current U.S. 
dollars controls for the U.S. economy interfering 
with the study. Because both variables are in the 
same terms, changes in the U.S. economy due to 
inflation or international purchasing power affect 
both variables equally. GDP is expected to have 
a significant positive effect on bilateral aid given 
to LDCs. GDP growth is included in all eight equa-
tions to control for the economic cycle in each 
country. This study hypothesizes that in the years 
following an economic boom, countries will be 
more likely to give larger amounts of aid to LDCs. 
This is why one year of lag is given to the GDP 
growth variable. All economic data are from the 
World Bank. The final variable in each equation 
measures the political ideology that has control 
of the country. This variable is different for each 
country, since the political system in each coun-
try is different. The data for the political variables 
are from European Election Database, Uselec-
tionatlas.org and Electionresources.org. The base 
regression equation with a place holder for the 
political variable is as follows:
Bilateral aid to LDCs = GDP + GDP growth 
(Lagged 1 year) + Political Variable 
 Variables that represent significant time 
periods are also present for certain equations. 
As mentioned before, Moss and Goldstein (2005) 
suggested the Cold War era may have an impact 
on bilateral aid. This variable is included in the U.S. 
regressions. Fleck and Kilby (2010) found a rise in 
aid coinciding with the beginning of the War on 
Terror. This “War on Terror” variable is included in 
the final equations for both the United States and 
the United Kingdom. It is found insignificant for the 
France equation.
 Appendix A contains a list of current LDCs 
for reference as of 2010. It should be noted that 
the countries contained in this list have changed 
slightly over time. The data used in the regressions 
reflect these changes.
Ideology Variable for the United States
 In the U.S., The Democratic Party is more 
liberal while the Republican Party is more conser-
vative. The President of the United States has sig-
nificant power in determining the foreign policy 
of the country. The House and the Senate in the 
U.S. both have the power to vote down an appro-
priations bill. Therefore, the ideology of all three 
will be included in the U.S. political variable. This 
study codes the party control of the House, Sen-
ate, and Presidency into a three letter variable. 
The first letter of the variable represents which 
party has control of the House. The second rep-
resents which party has control of the Senate. The 
Warren
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third represents the party 
that has control of the Presi-
dency. For example, if the 
Republicans controlled the 
House and the Senate, while 
the Democrats controlled 
the presidency, the variable 
would be “RRD”.  Five differ-
ent combinations of party 
control in the U.S. have oc-
curred since 1960. The com-
binations are “DDD,” “DDR,” 
“RRD,” “RDR,” “DRR,” and 
“RRR”. The combination 
that has not occurred from 
1960-2009 is “RDD”. In the 
regression equations for the 
U.S. DDD is not included be-
cause it is the control vari-
able. This means that all the 
other political variables are 
in terms of full democratic 
control. Since full democrat-
ic control means full liberal 
control for the purposes of 
this study, all other U.S. politi-
cal variables are predicted 
to have a significant nega-
tive impact on the amount 
of bilateral aid given to 
LDCs. These political vari-
ables are constructed in 
the same way that the Moss 
and Goldstein (2003) con-
structed their political vari-
ables.
U.S. aid to LDCs = GDP + GDP growth – DDR – 
RRD – RDR – DRR – RRR
III. RESULTS: UNITED STATES
 Table 1 shows the results for the U.S. equa-
tions. GDP was positive and significant at the .01 
level across both equations. The War on Terror 
variable was also significant at the .01 level across 
both equations. It accounted for an extra $1.9 bil-
lion in bilateral aid in the full equation and an ex-
tra 1.2 billion bilateral aid dollars in the 1980-2010 
equation. The Cold War variable however, was 
not significant in the 1980-2010 equations and was 
only significant at the .1 level in the full equation. 
The “War on Terror” results agree with the findings 
of the most recent Fleck and Kilby (2010) study. 
 
When using full liberal government as the con-
trol for the U.S. there is a significant reduction in 
bilateral aid given in three out of the other five 
government combinations across both equa-
tions. These government combinations are repre-
sented in table 1 by RRR, RDR and RRD variables. 
Each is significant at the .01 level.  The years that 
they span are:  2003-2006 (W. Bush administration 
“RRR”), 2001-2002 (W. Bush administration “RDR”), 
and 1995-2000  (Clinton administration “RRD”). 
The DDR variable is significant (in the negative 
direction) at the .05 level in the 1980-2010 equa-
tion only. It includes 1987-2002 (Regan and Bush 
administrations) and 2007-2008 (W. Bush adminis-
tration).  The only political combination that did 
not have significantly lower bilateral aid given to 
LDCs was the DRR variable which occurred from 
1981 through 1986 during the Reagan administra-
tion. 
Warren
Table 1: Regression Results For Both U.S. Equations
 U.S. 1960-2009 U.S. 1980-2009 
GDP (Current U.S. dollars) .0003745*** .00047558***
(-0.913) (-0.856)
GDP Growth (1 Year of Lag) -79767710 *** -116575058* 
(-.102) (-.121)
War on Terror (1 = Yes)  1934041998 ***  1206057149 ***
(-0.477) (-0.472)
Cold War (1= Yes)  659594293 * 496931025
(-0.185) (-0.169)
DDR -238740658   -698157135 ** 
(-.064) (-.156)
DRR -208934383 -20543046
-0.039  (-.004)
RRD   -1382599605 ***    -1816575842 *** 
(-.255) (-.366)
RDR  -2602987158 ***  -2956482333 *** 
(-.290) (-.372)
RRR -1252985346 *** -1368485098 *** 
(-.193) (-.234)
Adjusted R Squared 0.937 0.935
1. Significant at .1 =* ; .05 =** ; .01 = ***
2. Number in parenthesis = Beta weights
3. Political Variables  are in terms of full Democrat (left-wing) Control 
“DDD”
4. Political Variable code = first letter is  House control, second letter is 
Senate control, third letter is Presidency control 
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 These results generally support the hypoth-
esis that more conservative governments give 
less bilateral aid to LDCs. However, the 1981-1986 
(Reagan administration) “DRR” variable does not 
support the hypothesis.  Figure 1 shows a plot of 
U.S. bilateral aid to LDCs over time.
Ideology Variable for the United Kingdom
 In the U.K. the Labour Party represents 
the more liberal ideology while the Conservative 
Party represents the more conservative party. For-
eign policy in the U.K. is determined by the prime 
minister and the cabinet ministers. Cabinet minis-
ters are appointed by the prime minister. Appro-
priation bills in the U.K. are passed by the House 
of Commons. Therefore, the government groups 
that have the most power to influence bilateral 
aid to LDCs are the Prime Minister and the House 
of Commons. Since the party that controls the 
House of Commons also controls the Prime Minis-
ter seat, the variable for the U.K. is reduced down 
to a single dummy variable called “Prime Minis-
ter.” A “1” indicates a liberal Prime Minister (and 
liberal majority in the House of Commons), and a 
“0” indicates a conservative Prime Minister (and 
conservative majority in the House of Commons). 
The full regression equation for the United King-
dom is as follows:
U.K. aid to LDCs =
 GDP + GDP growth + Prime Minister
IV. RESULTS: UNITED KINGDOM
 For the United Kingdom, the GDP variable 
and the War on Terror variable were both posi-
tive and significant at the .01 level across the full 
equation and the 1980-2009 equation. The results 
are shown in Table 2. Similar to the results for the 
United States, the War on Terror has had a sub-
stantial effect. The full model shows an extra 600 
million bilateral aid dollars given to LDCs as a re-
sult of the War on Terror and the 1980-2010 model 
shows an extra 450 million dollars given. Figure 2 
shows a timeline of United Kingdom bilateral aid 
allocation.
 The political variable for the United King-
dom was not significant in either equation, which 
does not support the hypothesis of this study. 
There are several possible explanations why the 
ideology variable was insignificant in the United 
Kingdom case. The most obvious answer is that 
the Conservative Party and the Labour Party sim-
ply do not differ in their views on foreign policy 
and, more specifically, on bilateral aid allocation. 
This explanation should be given some degree of 
credit; recently, the Labour Party has begun mov-
ing closer to the position of the Conservative Party 
on a number of issues, including economic issues. 
Another explanation is omitted variable bias. The 
House of Lords was an omitted variable in these 
equations and may have had an impact. 
Ideology Variable for France
 In France the more liberal ideology is rep-
resented by an alliance of political parties includ-
ing the Socialist Party, the French Communist Par-
ty, the Greens, the Radical Socialist Party, and the 
Citizen’s Movement Party. The more conservative 
ideology is represented by a different alliance of 
parties including the Union for Popular Movement, 
the Rally for 
the Republic, 
and the Union 
for French De-
mocracy. This 
means that the 
political vari-
ables in the 
equations for 
France repre-
sent the alli-
ances instead 
of individual 
parties. 
 E x e c u t i v e 
Powers are split 
between the 
Warren
Table 2: U. K. Regression Results For Both Equations
 U.K  1960-2009 U.K.  1980-2009 
GDP (Current U.S. dollars) .00079900887124 *** .0009844897909*** 
(-0.898) (-0.924)
GDP Growth (1 Year of Lag) -19263319.46 -42981144
(-.050) (-.102) 
Labour Party Prime Minister (1=Yes) 58771709.23 29943316.52
(-0.043) (-0.020)
War On Terror 593834247.78 *** 448709281***
(1=Yes) (-0.319) (-0.271)
Adjusted R Squared 0.884 0.865
Significant at .1 =* ; .05 =** ; .01 = ***
Number in parenthesis = Beta weights 
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president and the prime minister. Both have pow-
er in determining foreign policy. Appropriation 
bills are voted on by both the National Assem-
bly and the Senate. The Senate has been con-
servative controlled since 1960. The ideology in 
control of the National Assembly of France is also 
the ideology in control of the Prime Minister po-
sition. Therefore, the political variable for France 
is reduced down to two dummy variables. In this 
equation those variables will be called the “Presi-
dent variable” and the “Prime Minister” variable. 
The “Prime Minister” variable is a “1” if the liberal 
alliance controls the Prime Minister position (also 
means control of National Assembly) and a “0” 
of the conservative alliance controls the position. 
The President dummy variable works in the same 
way. The full regression equation for France is as 
follows:
France’s bilateral aid to LDCs = GDP + GDP 
growth + Prime Minister + President +
GDP + GDP growth + liberal control 
V. RESULTS: FRANCE
 The GDP variable for France was sig-
nificant and positive at the .01 level across both 
equations. Table 3 shows the final regression 
equations for France. A War on Terror variable 
was attempted for both of the France regressions 
and was found insignificant. Results for the France 
equations with the War on Terror variable includ-
ed are found in Appendix B. 
 The prime minister variable for France was 
found insignificant across both equations. The 
president variable was found positive and signifi-
cant for both equations. The president variable is 
significant at the .01 level in the full model and is 
significant at the .05 level in the 1980-2009 model.
 The results from the presidency variable support 
the hypothesis of this study, but the results from 
the prime minister variable do not. Both the prime 
minister’s party and the president’s party have 
varied consistently over time. From 1960-1980, the 
President of France was of the conservative par-
ty alliance. From 1981-2009 the president was of 
the liberal party alliance. Figure 3 shows a plot of 
France’s bilateral aid allocation over time. 
 Similar to the United Kingdom situation, 
there are a number of possibilities to explain why 
the prime minister variable is not significant in the 
equation. One explanation is that the ideology 
of the left alliance in the National Assembly and 
prime minister seat are not that different from the 
ideology of the right alliance. However, this expla-
nation is not as plausible in this case as it was in 
the case of the U.K. because it includes the presi-
dent variable that is significant. Since the presi-
dent variable is significant in this case, it suggests 
that the party alliances do act differently when 
they are in power (in regards to bilateral aid al-
location). An alternative explanation is that the 
Prime Minister seat and majority control on the 
National Assembly have less power over bilateral 
aid distribution than the presidency does. 
weights 
 
Ideology Variable for Japan
 In Japan the liberal ideology is represent-
ed by an alliance of parties (also known as the 
total opposition): The 
Social Democratic Par-
ty, People’s New Party, 
and New Party Nippon. 
The conservative ideol-
ogy is represented by 
a separate alliance of 
parties (also known as 
the ruling coalition): The 
Liberal Democratic Par-
ty (LDP), New Komeito 
Party, and Japan Re-
naissance Party. Appro-
priation bills in Japan 
are voted on by the 
House of Representa-
tives (lower house).  The 
Prime Minister of Japan 
Warren
Table 3: Final Regression Results For France
 France 1960-2009 France 1980-2009
GDP (Current U.S. dollars) .00059414550 *** .000501698854 ***
(-0.765) (-0.714)
GDP Growth (1 Year of Lag) -14908190.65 -4311037.16
(-.050) (-.011)
President (1=Liberal) 466857912.52 *** 376003464.676** 
(-0.369) (-0.423)
Lower House (1=Majority Liberal) 
(Prime Minister liberal) 
34481836.77 -11558884.21
(-0.026) (-.013)
Adjusted R Squared 0.707 0.187
1.  Significant at .1 =* ; .05 =** ; .01 = ***  
2.  Number in parenthesis = Beta weights
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has substantial power in deter-
mining foreign policy. The Prime 
Minister of Japan and the House 
of Representatives have been 
controlled by the conservatives 
over all years of this study (ex-
cept for a 3-year situation from 
93’-96’).  
 After the election of ‘93, 
members of both alliances cast 
a vote of no confidence against 
the newly elected Prime Minister 
Morihiro Hosokawa. Hosokawa 
in return dissolved the House of 
Representatives, which caused 
members of the LDP to defect and form new par-
ties. Some of these newly formed parties were 
allied with the more liberal opposition alliance 
which ultimately gave the liberal opposition alli-
ance a slight majority in the Lower House. This last-
ed until ‘96 when the LDP regained majority. This 
three year period from ‘93-’96 will be represented 
by the dummy variable called “liberal control”. 
The regression equation for Japan is as follows:
Japan’s bilateral aid to LDCs = GDP + GDP 
growth + liberal control
VI. RESULTS: JAPAN
 GDP is positive and significant at the .01 
level across both equations for Japan. However, 
the political variable for Japan is not significant in 
either equation. Table 4 shows the regression re-
sults for Japan. 
 Similar to the models for France and the 
United Kingdom, there are several possible expla-
nations for why the political variable for Japan 
was insignificant.  The bilateral aid allocation rul-
ing coalition may not differ substantially from the 
bilateral aid allocation of the opposition alliance. 
Another possible explanation involves the data 
set used to test the Japan model. As mentioned 
before, the opposition alliance only controlled 
the House of Representatives (and prime minister 
seat) for a total of three years over the course of 
this study. During that three year period, a num-
ber of former ruling coalition members joined 
the opposition coalition and one of the sessions 
of the House of Representatives was dissolved 
by the prime minister. It is possible that there was 
not enough time to make a meaningful change 
in policy, specifically foreign policy involving bi-
lateral aid allocation, during this period. A plot of 
Japan’s bilateral aid allocation to LDCs over time 
is shown in figure 4. 
VII. LIMITATIONS
 Aside from aforementioned limitations, 
there are several areas where the models do not 
capture exactly what they are intended to cap-
ture. The GDP growth variable which was present 
in every equation is either insignificant or signifi-
cant in the negative direction. These results do 
not support the hypothesis of this study. The GDP 
growth variable is intended to control for the eco-
nomic cycle. These findings suggest that either 
GDP growth is not an accurate indicator of the 
economic cycle for this equation or that the eco-
nomic cycle has no effect on bilateral aid alloca-
tion to LDCs. Future research in this area may be 
needed to find a more accurate indicator for the 
economic cycle if it does affect bilateral aid al-
location. 
 Another limitation of this study is that the 
political variable across each equation only 
roughly captures the actual ideology. The politi-
cal variables in the equations used here capture 
only the ideology of the party or alliance of par-
ties and not the ideology of the actual political 
office holder. Therefore, variations in ideology 
across the same party or party alliance are not 
captured here. A very liberal office holder in the 
more liberal party is counted equally with a cen-
trist liberal in the same party even though their 
ideologies and the impacts they have on policy 
are likely different. 
 Perhaps the most serious limitation of this 
study is that disasters and events are unaccount-
Warren
Table 4: Regression results for both equations for Japan 
 Japan 1960-2009 Japan 1980-2009
GDP (Current U.S. dollars) .000277851 *** .0001824182 ***
(-0.909) (-0.671)
GDP Growth (1 Year of 
Lag)
-3251078.98 14804663.58
(-.021) (-0.087)
No Confidence / Split
(1 = yes)
74225811.48 351561898.41 **
(-0.032) (-0.287)
Adjusted R Squared 0.872 0.707
1. Significant at .1 =* ; .05 =** ; .01 = ***
2. Number in parenthesis = Beta weights
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ed for (except the World War era and the War on 
Terror). This means that whichever side happens 
to be in power when these events and disasters 
occur will experience a boost to their bilateral aid 
output. Examples of these disasters and events 
include the genocide in Rwanda, and Hurricane 
Irene. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
 The findings of this study indicate that ide-
ology affects bilateral aid allocation differently 
in each country. In the United Kingdom and in 
Japan the results suggest that ideology may not 
have a substantial impact on bilateral aid allo-
cation to LDCs. However, these results disagree 
from what past studies have found. The measure 
of ideology in this study is systematically differ-
ent than it was in the previous studies. Most prior 
studies employed an ideology index similar to the 
indexes proposed by Budge (1993) and Potrafke 
(2009). This could have played a role in the differ-
ing results. In France, only the president is found to 
have a significant impact on bilateral aid alloca-
tion while the results suggest that the Prime Minis-
ter and National Assembly control has no substan-
tial effect on bilateral aid allocation. The War on 
Terror variable was significant and powerful in the 
United Kingdom yet it was insignificant in France. 
The results for France somewhat agree with the 
hypothesis of this study and past literature. It spe-
cifically raises the possibility that in France, it is not 
the ideology of the entire government that mat-
ters, but just that of the president in regards to bi-
lateral aid allocation to LDCs. 
 The results for the U.S. in this study indicate 
that a fully liberal controlled U.S. government gives 
more bilateral aid to LDCs than a split U.S. gov-
ernment or a fully conservatively controlled U.S. 
government. These differ from the results found in 
the Moss and Goldstein (2005) study even though 
the political variable was constructed in the same 
way. In the Moss and Goldstein (2005) study, only 
the RDR and RRD variables were found to have 
significantly reduced level of bilateral aid given. 
Their conclusion was that only certain split gov-
ernment administrations saw lower bilateral aid 
given. 
 This may be due to a number of differenc-
es between the two models. The database used 
for the Moss and Goldstein (2005) study included 
only Sub-Saharan African countries (which largely 
coincide with LDCs, see appendix A) and only 
spanned from 1961-2001. The economic control 
variables in the Moss and Goldstein (2005) study 
also differ from the economic control variables 
used in this study. The results of the impact of ide-
ology on bilateral aid given do, however, agree 
with the findings of all three of the Fleck and Kil-
by studies (2001) (2003) (2010). Ultimately, when 
addressing aid allocation from the U.S, this study 
adds more weight to the argument that liberals 
do give more bilateral aid to developing coun-
tries than conservatives. 
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APPENDIX A
LDC countries as of 2010 
 
Africa – (33) Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Co-
moros, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guin-
ea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia 
 
Asia – (10) Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Timor-Leste, Yemen 
 
Pacific  - (4) Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tu-
valu Vanuatu 
 
Caribbean – (1) Haiti
Appendix B Supplemental France Regression Results
Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of Estimate
1 0.864 0.747 0.716 3.17 E+ 08
a. Predictors: (Constant), GDPgrowth, majority Parliment, President, WARonTERROR, GDP
Coefficients
Model Understandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t-statis-
tic
Sig.
1 (Constant) 16790947.44 1.78E+08 0.094 0.925
President 5.14E+08 1.24E+08 0.399 4.164 0
majorityParliament 262765.323 1.19E+08 0 0.002 0.998
WARonTERROR -17311282.07 2.09E+08 -0.011 -0.083 0.934
GDP 0.001 0 0.832 5.682 0
GDPgrowth 16019323.43 31006134 0.057 0.517 0.608
a. Dependent Variable: LDCaid
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APPENDIX C
